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BAR BRIEFS

THE PRESIDENT'S PAGE
Does the jury need to be saved from its friends? In the days of
monarchical tyranny, it is easily conceivable that this institution was
the greatest bulwark of the people's rights; and today, when that particular, danger is past, it is a bulwark against the tyranny of law. Law
in its nature must be a strict and rather iron-bound thing, else it would
not be law at all, but anarchy. Fortunately, men are bigger and
broader than their institutions, laws and doctrines; and the province of
making exceptions to fit hard cases is particularly suitable for the jury,
who can more easily perform that function than can a technically
trained judge.
For many years, and today in England and our own federal
courts, the jury was an all-powerful trier of questions of fact, but
under the supervision of an unbiased expert, the judge. The superintending power of the judge has disappeared in most states, and the
one unprejudiced man of experience in the court room is absolutely
disqualified from giving any help to the jury in their determination of
questions of fact. The judge has become little more than a timekeeper, and must, as one jurist remarked, learn to model his conduct
on the meek and lowly oyster.
This change has apparently been caused by two things which are
almost one, democratic dislike of even the semblance of authority, and
suspicion of experts. Democracy has many virtues, and some undoubted faults; among which its unwillingness to use experts is possibly the greatest. Yet democracy is the very form of government
which most needs experts; and in our complicated modern life it perhaps cannot survive permanently unless it learns to make use of them
and place a certain amount of confidence in them.
The suggestion is frequently heard that a substitute for jury trial
must be found. Those of us who believe that the institution has a
vital part in our civilization wish it preserved, and to that end desire
that it be given the most efficient form. The subject is a large one,
meriting careful study, but two main features easily suggest themselves; the formation of the jury, and expert aid to it.
The theory of the jury is that it should be a cross-section of the
body politic; but if the better citizens endeavor to escape jury service,
the less desirable court it, and mere newspaper acquaintance with a
case of public concern, such as intelligent men generally have, is to be
treated as a disqualification, then we will get in practice sub-standard
juries. A selective system, it would seem, might well be applied to
the panel.
It is indeed sometimes said that if the judge may comment on the
evidence, he will exercise too great an influence on the minds of jurymen; but such a statement is calculated to provoke a smile from those
acquainted with our democratic fellow-citizens. Bowing too low to
expert opinion is not a fault of Americans.
Unless a sincere effort is made to make the jury more efficient, its
existence may well be endangered.-JoHN H. Lzwis, President.
JURY TRIALS
Beginning this month we publish, in three installments, the gist
of an article by John H. Wigmore in the April issue of the Journal of
the American Judicature Society, in which he voices his opinion con-
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cerning the merits and demerits of the American jury trial. His treatment of the subject is under five heads, to-wit:
i. Demerits erroneously imputed to jury trial, instead of to
other things;
Demerits non-inherent in jury trial, and remediable;
2.
3. Demerits inherent in jury trial, but remediable;
4. Demerits alleged but not true in fact;
5. Demerits inherent, and not remediable; and
6. Merits of jury trial.
This issue will deal with items i and 2, the June issue with items
3, 4 and 5, and the July issue with item 6.
i. Demerits Erroneously Imputed
(a) Waste of Time by Postponements and Other Use of Procedural Rules: This is not imputable to jury trial, though frequently
mentioned in attacks on it. All our procedure, both civil and criminal,
is wasteful and calls for thorough revision; but jury trial itself does
not involve these wastes. Any business engineer could organize jury
trial without such waste.
(b) Waste of Time Through Appellate Reversals and New
Trial Orders: This is not chargeable to jury trial, but to poor rules
for reversals. The English rules have been reformed.
(c) Unwise or Unfair Rules of Law: These occasionally require verdicts which are unsatisfactory, and the jury system receives
the blame-as in the recent Sinclair and Remus cases. But such defects should be discriminated.
(d) Technicalities of the Rules of Evidence: These are indeed
in need of reform. But the jury system is not chargeable with them.
In England today, with the jury preserved, not half a dozen cases a
year call for Supreme Court rulings on the law of evidence.
(e) Unseemly Conduct of Trial by Lawyers and Judges: Yes,
there is a sad plenty of this, in certain regions at least. But it is not
chargeable to jury trial. It is chargeable, in the first place, to local
bad standards in general; in the next place, to weak or low-standard
judges who do not control the proceedings; and thirdly to any public
trial at all, where the press and the people are admitted.
(f) General Inefficiency of Criminal Procedure: Often this is
loosely assumed to be imputable more or less to jury trial. But the
recent surveys of crime have shown that in the whole machinery of
criminal justice, from police to Supreme Court, jury trials play only
a small part-never as much as io per cent.
2. Demerits Non-Inherent
(a) Injustice of Verdicts, Due to Acceptance of Mentally Incompetent Jurors and Rejection of Competent Ones: None of this
is inherent in jury trial. The methods of selection have been allowed
to degenerate, until in many regions at least the mental quality of
jurors is a byword. But this is quite needless. The community at
large has just as many competent persons as it ever had. Exactly
the same fact could be asserted against the judicial personnel, in some
regions. But it is all remediable, in both cases. Any business engineer could improve the system of selecting jurors, so as to remove
this defect. Any commercial or industrial enterprise would go into
bankruptcy if it had no better personnel system than the one we endure
for jury trial.

BAR BRIEFS

(b)

Injustice of Verdicts, Due to Jurors' Inexperience in Weigh-

ing Testimony:

In part, this allegation is not true in fact; jurors in

a good proportion of cases are as well or better qualified than a judge.
But, so far as it is true, it is needless and is remediable. Its prevalence
in modern times is due to the abolition, a century ago, in all but a few
States, of the judge's power to comment to the jury on the evidence.
That guidance was a'known feature of jury trial when our fathers
put it into the Constitution. This charge against jury trial is readily
remediable.
(c) Injustice of Verdicts, Due to Jurors' Emotion and Bias:
This charge is the one most often and emphatically repeated. In the
first place, its prevalence is much exaggerated in fact. In the second
place, it is partly remediable, by restoring the judge's power to comment. In the third place, a good deal of it could equally be found in
the personnel of a judge-trial. And in the fourth place, what is left
of it is a virtue, not a vice, of jury trial. (See Merits)
Injustice of Verdicts, Due to Jurors' Corruption: Not
(d)
much is made of this. But so far as it occasionally exists, it is not
chargeable to jury trial, but to human nature. A judge can be corrupted, as well as a juror, and the detection is no easier. In a recent
notable criminal trial, in which the jury was waived (for fear of popular emotion),, and a lenient sentence was imposed, the number of
citizens who expressed the view that the judge had been bribed was
disappointingly large.
(e) Injustice of Verdicts, Due to the General Verdict Form, the
Mode of Giving Instructions, etc.: There is nothing inherent in these
defects. All of these features can be reformed. They have been in
some jurisdictions.
Waste of Time in Selection of Jurors: Of course this
(f)
should be improved. And it can be, without infringing on the jury
trial proper. An eminent Canadian judge-has told us that he in all his
experience only once knew the proceeding of selection to consume more
than half an hour. The time-waste is chargeable to the legal profession, not to the jury system.
(g) Sacrifice of Business Convenience by Jurors' Abandonment
of Occupation: Most of this is needless. A flexible plan, permitting
attendance at convenient times, is perfectly feasible. It is already in
use in some jurisdictions.
(h) Jurors' Discomfort During Service: This is a large fact,
and a disgraceful one, in many regions. But it is anything but inherent in the jury system. It is due to low ideals of decency in the
community and slackness of court officials. Every courthouse ought
to have a spacious set of rooms with every hotel comfort for the jurors.
There is no-need for treating them like down-and-out lodgers. When
a community is ready to give the jurors ample quarters, equally.comfortable with those of the judges, this defect will disappear.
.EQUAL PROTECTION
Mr. Paul Campbell, of Minot, presents the following article concerning small claims, court costs, legal aid societies and public defenders:
"No man shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. Every man is entitled to the equal protection
of the law".--Constitution.

